Abstract
Introduction
Intrusion intention recognition is to interpret and judge the purpose, vision and intention of attackers through analyzing a large number of low-level alarm information, which is to give a reasonable explanation of a large number of attack data. Identifying attack intention can determine the real purpose of attackers and predict the subsequent attack behavior, which is the premise and foundation of threat analysis and the important part of network security situation awareness. It has become a hot topic in the field of network security.
At the earliest, the research of intention recognition was carried out in the field of artificial intelligence. Intention of agent is the chosen planning route to achieve a goal [1, 2] , which role is to guide the rational decision-making and plan future behavior. Intention recognition is the process of apperceiving and reasoning intention of agent. In network security field, the research of attack intention recognition has just begun. At present, existing research is divided into two parts. A method builds attack scenario through correlating the alarms of intrusion detection systems, the other one enumerates all possible attack behavior by constructing attack graphs. The paper [3] correlated the alarms through modeling attack behavior. For a single attack behavior, the method refined the preconditions and consequences of the attack. Then the method correlated two attack behaviors according matching condition between prerequisite of subsequent behavior and consequences of previous acts. Thus, the method is no need to establish attack pattern base, and it can discover some unknown attack scenario with flexibility. The paper [4] automatically generated attack strategy described by attack strategy graph through alarm correlation. The method correlated the ultra-alarm generalized by the alarms with same essence. The flexibility and associate efficiency of method was increased, and the method simplified the analysis of attack strategy by measuring the similarity between attack strategies to discover the essence of the attack strategies. The paper [5] proposed a complex attack prediction method based on fuzzy hidden Markov model, identified attack scenarios membership of alarms by using stage transition matrix and fuzzy difference method. These alarm correlation methods can find attackers' behavior characteristics and analyze attack strategy, but alarm correlation is a rebuilding process of attack behavior after attacks. Due to identifying intention after attacks, these methods can't provide support for advance guard.
The methods, analyze and correlate by exploiting vulnerabilities, can reasoning and predict intrusion by simulating attacks which security analysis in the form of attack graphs synthesizing the network topology, vulnerability information, firewall rules and other information. The paper [6] proposed application model to automatically generate attack graph. The paper [7] reduced the complexity of attack graph to easily understand using connection matrix clustering techniques. The paper [8] implements policy-based multi-host, multi-step analysis of the vulnerability. Model representation of network and simplifying the attack rules can greatly reduce the time to generate attack graph. The paper [9] analyzed network security protection using attack graph. However, most of these methods which are static analysis can't adaptively adjust the generation and display of attack graph based on real attacks and response measures. And the study of uncertainty that the probability of being exploited of attacks caused by different attack difficulty and hidden degree is not yet sufficient.
Therefore, we proposed a dynamic real-time network attack intention recognition method based on attack route graph. By correlating real-time network attacks and vulnerabilities, the method determines spread routes and stages of attack based on graph theory and probability theory, then dynamically reasoning possible intrusion intention and its probability according to attack behavior characteristics and network environment.
Real-Time Network Attack Intention Recognition Model
Attack intention recognition is a process of reasoning and judging intruders' intention. In practice, it is very difficult to identify the intention. Due to the complex of intruders' intention, it is difficult to establish a intention base to clear descript all intentions of attackers. And the uncertainty of complex attacks, which achieve an attack intention with different attacks combination and intrusion paths and exist randomness in attack process, increase difficulties to intention recognition.
Computer network is an open complex system. Achievement of intrusion intention not only depends on attackers themselves, but also relates specific network environment and protection measures. Therefore, the intrusion intention achieved by attackers is limited and predictable given a known network environment and protective measures. We proposed a dynamic attack intention recognition model based on network attack-defense confrontation (as shown Figure. 1 
Security Event
Security event alert is the advanced alarms after information fusion, which uses a seven-tuple (id, time, Sip, Dip, Sport, Dport, AttackType) to represent. Where id is a unique identifier of the event, time is the occurrence time of the event, Sip is the attacker's source address, Dip is the attack target address, Sport is the attacker's source port, Dport is the attack destination port, AttackType is the attack type used by the attack.
Network Connectivity
Network connectivity represents communication relationship between hosts. To protect the important assets of network, managers will set up firewall access policy to prevent the external hosts access the internal network or only allow communication through specific ports. We use a triple to describe the network Connectivity ( , , ) 
ij h o s t h o s t p r o to c o l p o r t , where

Vulnerability Exploiting Relationship
Vulnerability exploiting relationship represents dependency attacks with vulnerabilities, which is successful invasion probability of an attack exploiting the specific vulnerability. We use a triple to describe the vulnerability exploiting relationship ( a , , Calculating the dependency attacks with vulnerabilities is an important research direction in the field of information security, which requires analysis of a large number of attack data, and combined with prior knowledge of network security experts. We calculate () ij pe by referencing CVSS [10] (Common Vulnerability Scoring System). VS (Vulnerability Scores) can be got based on CVSS, which ranges from 0 to 10. When VS = 0, it indicates that the attack could not exploit the vulnerability; when VS = 10, it indicates invasion will be successful. In this paper, a simple conversion defines as ( )
Attack Intention Stage Transition Model
We use ( . If successful invasion of an attack intention need all of the two attacks must be successful, the dependency of two attacks is parallel relationship, e=1; if successful invasion of an attack intention just need any one of two attacks, the dependence of two attacks is select relationship, e=0; s represents the stage of attack intention.
The attack pattern base can be generated from known network attack mode based on the model. Figure. 2 is an instance of a state transition diagram of an attacks intention. 
Real-Time Attack Intention Identification and Prediction
Information Fusion
Currently a large number of security sensors are deployed in the network, alarm information from intrusion detection systems, firewalls, virus detection systems and other sensing devices reflect the different levels of security status. However, the data format is chaotic, and there is a lot of redundancy and false positives, which cannot be applied directly to the network security analysis. Currently, there are some algorithms [11] [12] [13] to fuse alarm information. Use the proposed algorithm in [11] for data to fuse alarm information and get more accurate attack probability p(a), so that the alarm information from different sensors complementary and mutually confirmed, more accurate information about attack can be obtained.
Attack success depends on attack techniques and its environment configuration and vulnerability information of the invasion network, just when the environment configuration and vulnerability information of intrusion network can be exploited by this attack, it can be successful invasion. So successful invasion probability p(ac) will be calculating based on the exploit relationship of vulnerabilities ( a , , 
Where p(a) is the invasion probability, j v l u s is the vulnerabilities exploiting by the attack, () ij pe is the probability of successful invasion when the attack exploiting the depending vulnerability, 
Attack Scenario Clustering
Due to network may be attacked by many intruders in a same period of time, it needs cluster the security event into different attack scenarios to identify intrusion intention of each attackers. We divide each new received alert into attack scenario based on a quantitative alarm correlation method.
In a same multi-step attack, since the intrusion intention and target is very clear, the property of security event caused by attack steps exist some correlation. For example, if represents the weight. The two parameters can be selected according to Reference [14] . When the system receives a new security event, we calculate attack correlation degree between the alert with every saved attack scenarios. If there are many correlation degree exceed the pre-set threshold, then put the alert into the attack scenario with largest correlation degree. If all correlation degree doesn't exceed the pre-set threshold, consider the security incident as a new attack scenario. 
Real-Time
The method clustered real-time alerts into different attack scenes based on attack correlation degree, and associated the alerts with attack pattern base. We summarize 3 kinds of typical scene (shown as Figure. 3).
S1
S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S1 Figure. 3(a) shows the normal transferring, which the previous state and the post state of an attack intention can occur sequentially. In Figure. 3(b) , the state transfers from S1 to S3 without discovering S2, which we call it as skipped transferring. Actually it is the most common scene in a real network due to the high false negative rate existing in the intrusion detection equipment caused by the difference between detection strategies and characters of intrusion. As shown in Figure. 3(c), the repeated transferring represents the scene that some state occurs repeatedly, like S1. This is always because the alert data is delayed while transmission or the clocks in different security sensors are asynchronous. Based on the above analysis, the Real-Time Attack Stage Recognition Algorithm can be described in the following.
Algorithm. 1. Real-Time Attack Stage Recognition Algorithm
Input: fusion security events Output: the intention of attacker; the current attack phase 
Begin
Step 1: Calculate the attack correlation degree, cor (a,b) , between the real-time alerts and the current state of the generated attack scene, c u rre n t s . Then cluster the alerts into different attack scenes according to the attack correlation degree.
Step 2: By analyzing the correlation between alerts in each attack scene and the generated attack pattern base ( ( ), ( ), ) A s E s s , search for the attack stage s, and record the current time t.
Step 3: If the previous state of s is the current state in the attack scene, which can be described by the equation Step 6: If s isn't latter than the current state, this situation dedicates this attack pattern haven't been occurred. We label this attack path as a new attack path and add it into the attack pattern base. Set bool(s) =true, update the current state, c u r r e n t ss  , as well as the state occurring time, c u r r e n t tt  . Then turn to Step1.
Step 7: Associated the attack scene and the attack pattern base, we can get the attack intention set {G1, G2,…, Gn}. The attack technology and stage of attack patterns can possibly be the same, so we can recognize several attack intentions according to the generated attack scene (as shown in Figure. .This set represents the essential vulnerabilities which attackers exploit to achieve a certain attack phase. The attacker perhaps utilize various attack method to achieve the aim, thus this set contains more than one element. Definition. 5. Accessible Host, which means the set of hosts which can be used to carry out the post intrusion. This set includes the host which exist the current attack state as well as the hosts that connect with it. Definition. 6. Exploitable Vulnerabilities Set. This concept means the vulnerabilities of accessible hosts that can be exploited by the attacker. In this paper we describe this set as  Because the ability of attacker is unknown, we suppose that the attacker can utilize all kinds of attack technologies; in the mean time we suppose that the attacker choose the next target with equal probability. The detailed process of the Real-Time Attack Stage Prediction Algorithm is described as the following.
Algorithm. 2. Real-Time Attack Stage Prediction Algorithm
Input: the current attack path i p a th ; the recognized attack intention set {G1,G2,…,Gn} Output: the post attack stage; the post intrusion hosts.
Begin
Step 1: Waiting for the attack path that is updating. If the attack path turns into the current attack path c u rre n t s , turn to Step 2. Otherwise repeat this step.
Step 2: Search for the accessible hosts according to the attack-existed host and the connected relationship. 
Where H is number of vulnerability in the minimum vulnerability group, () x pe is invasion access probability of vulnerabilities to the corresponding attack.
Given all of the available vulnerabilities set, we have
Experimental Analysis
In order to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model and algorithm, we build an experimental network, the network topology as shown in Figure. The firewall has a strong set of policies (shown in table I) to prevent remote access to SQL server. In particular, all machines in DMZ Zone passively receive service requests and only respond to the sender as needed. In order to accommodate Web service's transactions, the web server is allowed to send SQL queries to the SQL server. The firewall policy is network connectively relationship too. Through the network vulnerability scanning, the vulnerabilities of hosts are given in Table II . 
is O(kl).
2) Storage size. AG Algorithm, proposed in paper [6] , requires listing all states in the network, which the time complexity is ( 2 ) n O . In paper [15] , EDG Algorithm improves the scale by simplifying twice to eliminate the loops. TSTG Algorithm, proposed in paper [16] , avoids the above problems by lifting the authority and associated analyzing the attack. But it is hard to deal with the large network.
In this paper, the proposed stage recognition algorithm based on the attack intention divides attacks into different scenes rather than enumerate all states. We also avoid the redundancy of attack state and attack link by recognizing every attack intention. The scale of the proposed algorithm is polynomial. And it improves the comprehension of the attack scene by the recognition of attack intention. In the meantime, it avoids the appearance of loop through discussing the possible state transferring scenes to weaken the influence of false positive and repeated alert. TABLE IV compares the above algorithms in the network with 3 hosts and 5 vulnerabilities. 
Conclusions
Based on the basis of artificial intelligence intention recognition, we proposed a dynamic real-time network attack intention recognition algorithm. By correlating realtime security alerts and vulnerabilities, we found the spread route and stage of attacks based on graph theory and probability theory. Then we identified the attack intention and predicted the possible transition of attacks, combined with network connectivity relationship. A simulation experiments for the proposed network attack intention recognition algorithm is performed by network examples. The experimental results show that the proposed method can be more accurately identify attack intention and fully predict the post stage of attacks. Due to attackers always use deception, concealment or other means to conceal their behavior and intention, there is different between attackdefense intention recognition with intention recognition in artificial intelligence field. So the intrusion intention recognition needs further research.
